On April 27, 2026, the Arizona Supreme Court issued a ruling in Briana Hernandez v. Luis Arturo Loarca, Case No. CV-25-0161-PR (“Hernandez”), clarifying what constitutes harassment under Arizona’s criminal harassment statute, A.R.S. § 13-2921(E). Under Hernandez, a person commits harassment when they make a statement to a third-party with the intent to provoke an adverse consequence against the victim, even if the victim is not present at the time the statement is made. Hernandez also paves the way for similar harassment claims to be brought under Arizona’s parallel civil harassment statute, A.R.S. § 12-1809(T)(1)(a).
In Hernandez, the Arizona superior court granted Plaintiff Briana Hernandez’s (“Plaintiff”) ex parte petition for an order of protection against Defendant Luis Arturo Loarca (“Defendant”). In granting the order of protection, the superior court found that Defendant made statements to several of Plaintiff’s work colleagues at two separate places of employment, which were intended to inflict harm on Plaintiff by getting her disciplined at work. The Arizona court of appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, finding that Defendant’s actions were not “directed” at Plaintiff as that term is defined under A.R.S. § 13-2921(E). The Arizona Supreme Court then granted Plaintiff’s petition for review to determine whether communications made between a defendant and a third-party can be considered “directed” at the plaintiff under A.R.S. § 13-2921(E). According to Hernandez, they can.
The Arizona Supreme Court held that statements may be “directed” at a victim even when conveyed to a third-party so long as they are “designed to provoke an adverse consequence against the victim.” In reaching this holding, the Arizona Supreme Court first turned to the plain meaning of the phrase “directed at”. Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), Oxford English Dictionary 3.a (3d ed. 2000), and the Merriam-Webster online dictionary define “direct” as aiming or pointing toward a person or thing. This definition focuses “on the target of the communication, not its immediate recipient”, and so A.R.S. § 13-2921(E) “regulates conduct based on its target, not its transmission path”, according to Hernandez.
The Arizona Supreme Court next turned to the recent precedent established by the court of appeals in Raber v. Wagner, 571 P.3d 902 (Ariz. App. 2025). In Raber, the defendant sent emails to the plaintiff’s relatives, colleagues, and other contacts, asking them to “knock some sense into” the plaintiff. The Raber court held that A.R.S. § 13-2921(E) does contemplate harassment carried out via third-party communications, if those communications are intended to elicit action directed at the victim.
The court of appeal in Hernandez attempted to distinguish Raber on the grounds that Defendantdid not explicitly request the third-party recipients to take any action against Plaintiff. The Arizona Supreme Court found this reasoning to be flawed, noting that Raber did not turn on “an explicit request for action”, but rather, on “whether the communications targeted the victim and were intended to provoke an adverse consequence.” The danger of limiting the applicability of A.R.S. § 13-2921(E) to “express solicitations” is that a defendant charged with harassment couldwin on a technicality by phrasing their harassing statements in a manner that does not rise to the level of an “express solicitation”, even if the defendant intends the third-party recipient to take adverse action against the victim.
The Arizona Supreme Court also noted that its interpretation of “directed at” aligns with A.R.S. § 12-1809(T)(1)(a), Arizona’s civil harassment statute. In LeFaro v. Cahill, 203 Ariz. 482 (App. 2002), the court of appeal considered whether the defendant’s statements to third-parties were “directed at” the plaintiff under A.R.S. § 12-1809(T)(1)(a), given that they were made within the plaintiff’s earshot. Although the LeFaro court did not find that the defendant’s statements were directed at the plaintiff under the specific facts of that case, the court also did not establish abrightline rule prohibiting a finding that third-party communications may be “directed at” a plaintiff as that phrase is defined in A.R.S. § 12-1809(T)(1)(a).
The Hernandez opinion concludes by alluding to several open-ended questions regarding the scope of Arizona’s criminal and civil harassment statutes. Arizona’s civil harassment statute,A.R.S. § 12-1809(T)(1)(a), excludes from the definition of harassing behavior conduct that serves a legitimate purpose. Arizona’s criminal harassment statute, A.R.S. § 13-2921(E),contains no such exception. This distinction was not addressed in Hernandez because the trial court expressly found that the Defendant’s statements were not made for a legitimate purpose. However, the Hernandez opinion invites the Legislature “to consider whether complaints made for legitimate purposes, even though designed to provoke an adverse consequence against another person, should nevertheless fall within [A.R.S. § 13-2921(E)]’s reach” and cautioned thattoo broad of an application of A.R.S. § 13-2921(E)—i.e., one that does not carve out an exception for statements made for a legitimate purpose—may give rise to constitutional challenges on the basis of free speech.
Hernandez is a significant development in the interpretation of Arizona’s criminal harassment statute, and may also have broad implications with respect to Arizona’s parallel civil harassment statute. Conduct that may not have previously resulted in criminal or civil liability for harassment—i.e., statements made to third-parties—is now much more likely to fall within the Arizona Supreme Court’s definition of conduct “directed at” the victim, particularly if third-partystatements result in the third-party taking some adverse action against the victim. Whether the broad implications of A.R.S. § 13-2921(E) will withstand constitutional scrutiny or otherwise be addressed by the Legislature remains to be seen.
*Not intended to constitute legal advice to be relied upon. We recommend that you consult with legal counsel to receive tailored advice suitable to your circumstances.
